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THE TRUTHS THAT MAKE US FREE:
ETHICAL REFLECTIONS ON REPRODUCTIVE ENDOCRINOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
Reproductive endocrinologists make the seemingly impossible possible, a miraculous
event in the lives of countless couples who want nothing more than to welcome a biological child
– and perhaps many more – into the world. Their expertise is “the gift of life” – no pressure or
anything). As Dr. G. put it, “we try to find a way to give each patient we encounter everything
we have, and that means doing whatever it takes to make her dream of being a parent come true.”
While the enterprise of reproductive endocrinology is rather brightly lit and respected,
bordering on biological wizardry, it encounters as many bioethical speed-bumps as biological
triumphs. According to the five reproductive endocrinologists I encountered on rounds, they
struggle most with the concept of “false hope”: the idea that patients will inevitably believe their
skills and methods to be foolproof and faultless, that there is a perfect chance of success in
practice, that they will become pregnant without hindrance, without the chance of failure. But
this is not so. According to Dr. G., “several of these endeavors fail, and they are incredible
expensive; so we leave individuals not merely without hope, but without a significant portion of
cash as well.” Among other concerns surrounding this issue is the hesitance of the clinicians to
be forthcoming with potentially poor news regarding the success of a particular fertility
treatment. Another member of the team, Dr. W., framed it this way: “When I begin to recognize
some inconsistencies in the data, which therefore suggests the possibility – but just the
possibility – of failure, I’m really not sure if I’m morally obliged to share this with the patient. I
risk two things: first, being wrong; second, shattering her hope while still being wrong. I guess I
could look at it as preparing her, but I’m not even positive myself of what I would be preparing
her for.”
SOLVING THE “THERAPEUTIC PRIVLEDGE” DILEMMA
Among other things, Dr. W.’s concern turned on the notion of “therapeutic privilege,” a
rather controversial exception to obtaining informed consent from a patient with decisionmaking capacity. The idea is that giving individuals the truth about their unfortunate or, in this
case, potentially unfortunate, diagnoses and expecting them to make an agonizing choice to give
or withhold consent for burdensome (be it physical, emotional, or otherwise) treatment with an
uncertain outcome might devastate them.
Unfortunately, when patients are never told unfortunate and even potentially unfortunate
diagnoses, an intolerable situation often develops. Treatments are given, and clinicians and
friends have to perform a dance of pretending – pretending that the dilemma is only temporary,
pretending that the situation, and the persons most directly involved, “will soon be fine.”
Although it may seem that this is the merciful thing to do, most often it is not. There is no
evidence that informing patients of their situation when the diagnosis and prognosis are not good
– again, even if only potentially so – is more dangerous than pretending everything is fine.
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A nuanced notion of informed consent can rectify pressing problem above. In the
movement from fastened rules to honored values, the concept of shared decision sets forth the
two major elements of the informed consent doctrine: information and consent. The primary task
is for clinicians to inform patients about all of the medically accepted treatment options, as well
as the risks, burdens, and benefits associated with each. In receiving this information, patients are
able to exercise properly the appropriate freedom necessary for consent, in order that they might
participate meaningfully and morally in their treatment. There is a temptation for clinicians to
neglect disclosing all of the burdens, especially those that are only potential, because they are
naturally reluctant to discuss comprehensively the possible side effects of interventions they feel
the patient needs or even genuinely desires – here, becoming pregnant and delivering a healthy
child. Yet the patient needs this information if her consent is going to be truly informed. The
requirement that clinicians disclose all potential medical complications also means that the
clinicians may have to provide information that is less than preferable.
Among reasonable approaches to dilemmas such mentioned above is to ask the patient
what she wants to know before the process begins. This means that the clinician will ask the
patient – and in this way give her control over – whether she would like to be informed if
indicators become present that might, however minutely, connote the existence of a potential
future complication. This certainly makes easier the difficult and heavy judgment call the
clinician would, at best, struggle to morally defend in the absence of such a conversation.
Further, the more the patient consensually controls what she knows, the less there exists a moral
dilemma. To be sure, this alone does not relieve the burden of caring for those who may very
likely become disappointed, but it very unlikely affects any ethical justification for freelychosen, reasonable, realistic, and responsible actions.
MORAL OF THE STORY
The great temptation of modern medicine, not always resisted, is to move beyond the
promotion and preservation of health into the boundless realm of human happiness and wellbeing. The root problem of “biological hope” and potential disappointment is both medical and
philosophical or religious. “Why is this treatment not proving effective?” can be asked as a
technical, biological question, or as a question about the meaning of life. When medicine tries to
respond to the latter, which it is always under pressure to do, it moves beyond its proper role. It
is not medicine’s place to lift from us the burden of that suffering that turns on the meaning we
assign to the biological effectiveness of medical treatments for the body. It is not medicine’s
place to determine when the burden of disappointment, whether actual or potential, is too great to
be borne. Medicine should try to relieve human suffering, but only that suffering that is brought
on by biological phenomena, not that suffering that comes from anguish or despair at the human
condition.
Clinicians ought to relieve those forms of suffering that medically accompany serious
biological risks (physiological, psychological, or otherwise), even if only potential. They should
relieve pain (in a broad sense), do what they can to allay anxiety and uncertainty, and be a
comforting presence. As sensitive human beings, clinicians should be prepared to respond to
patients who ask why things are simply not working out for them, or why it was not “meant to
be” for them to become pregnant. But here the clinician and the patient are at the same level. The
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clinician may have no better an answer to these questions than anyone else, and certainly no
special insight from his or her training as a clinician. It would be terrible for clinicians to forget
this, and to think that medicine, in providing wishful words or, in contrast, not providing
potentially disappointing but genuinely concerning medical data, with no foundation in authentic
biological hope, has found its answer to the riddle of life. It would be a false answer, given by
the wrong people. It would be no less a false answer for patients. The problem is precisely that,
too often in human history, ignoring the real potential for disappointment and its subsequent
effect of producing ever greater vulnerability has seemed the quick, efficient way to put aside
that which burdens us. It rarely helps, and too often simply adds to one wrong still another.

